The 737 MAX: Boeing's Nightmare
by John Lawrence, April 5, 2019
Now we learn that the pilots on the doomed Ethiopian plane did properly follow the procedure for disengaging the MCAS system, but the plane crashed anyway. Possibly a bird strike took out the angle of attack sensor. The MCAS system was supposed to recover the plane from a stall, but instead it precipitated one. This was a totally faultily designed aircraft. One of the first things you learn as a student pilot is how to recover from a stall. The Wright brothers probably even knew how to recover from a stall. I practiced stall recoveries even without a flight instructor in the plane after I got my solo rating and even before I got my pilot's license. So why would Boeing design a plane taking stall recovery out of the hands of the pilots? What were these aeronautical engineers thinking? Or smoking?
To think that an every day occurrence like a bird strike would send a plane to its doom. Contrast this with the bird strike which took out the engines of a plane which Sully then expertly landed in the Hudson River. That's the difference between pilot control and computer control. And by the way why did it take Boeing's CEO so long to apologize to the families of those killed in the two airline crashes? Hubris! Boeing thinks it's so great and so wonderful that it can do no wrong. And Boeing's CEO's pay package is likely to suffer a hit as Boeing's stock slides. Indonesia’s national airline, Garuda, said it canceled its order for 49 737 MAXs because of “consumers’ low confidence” in the airplanes following the crashes.
Oh how the mighty have fallen. Boeing is a major exporter from the US. Confidence in its planes is absolutely essential if it hopes to compete with France's Airbus. The Washington Post reported:
Boeing is responding to rising public concerns about its Max planes in an effort to save the company’s image and prevent the loss of more business, said Shem Malmquist, an active Boeing 777 captain and a visiting professor at the Florida Institute of Technology.
“They took a different tack — a tack they should have taken in the first place,” Malmquist said.
The company’s changing response may be partly a function of how unusual the situation is, said Seth Seifman, an analyst at JPMorgan.
“The way that it took off in the press and on social media is not something that Boeing is used to,” he said. “It probably took some time to put together a public strategy to deal with that.”
Boeing's purported fix of a computer upgrade will not solve the problem. The problem is in taking control of the plane away from the pilots and placing it in the computer in the first place. Until Boeing eliminates the MCAS system altogether they will not have an airworthy plane. There is no reason why the aircraft's pilots cannot recover from a stall. The cure in this case was worse than the disease.
Of course Boeing is culpable and liable for the loss of life and property. However, they are lawyering up in an attempt to avoid the financial consequences of admitting that their airplane is a kluge. It wasn't even really certified by the FAA. The FAA delegated this little task to Boeing itself! Amazingly enough! And to reduce the cost of the plane Boeing did not require pilot simulator training in the new system. It also made safety features optional add-ons for more money. That's criminal in and of itself in my opinion. Neither of the planes that crashed had the optional safety features.
The plane maker has to walk a fine line in its public statements. Admitting that any fault lies in Boeing’s planes, including software, would create legal liability for the company and damage its reputation for safety, said Scott Hamilton, managing director at Leeham Company, an aviation consultant. “Their public statements are completely driven by what their lawyers will allow them to say,” Hamilton said.
The bigger engines were put on the 737 MAX in order to gain increased range and better fuel efficiency. However, this is what led to the perceived need for the MCAS system which, I maintain, was completely unnecessary. If the bigger engines increased the probability of a stall, the pilots were perfectly capable of recovering from that. The MCAS system needs to be eliminated altogether and pilots need to be trained on how to recover from a stall, something they should have learned in the first week of flight school.
